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Abstract: Covert timing channels are an important alternative for transmitting information in the
world of the Internet of Things (IoT). In covert timing channels data are encoded in inter-arrival
times between consecutive packets based on modifying the transmission time of legitimate traffic.
Typically, the modification of time takes place by delaying the transmitted packets on the sender side.
A key aspect in covert timing channels is to find the threshold of packet delay that can accurately
distinguish covert traffic from legitimate traffic. Based on that we can assess the level of dangerous of
security threats or the quality of transferred sensitive information secretly. In this paper, we study the
inter-arrival time behavior of covert timing channels in two different network configurations based on
statistical metrics, in addition we investigate the packet delaying threshold value. Our experiments
show that the threshold is approximately equal to or greater than double the mean of legitimate
inter-arrival times. In this case covert timing channels become detectable as strong anomalies.
Keywords: information security; computer networks; covert timing channels; inter-arrival times;
Internet of Things
1. Introduction
Covert channels are communications channels used to transmit information using existing system
resources that were not designed to carry data without being detected by network security mechanisms,
such as firewalls. Because of their ability to evade detection, they are create a grave cyber security
threat. Sensitive and confidential information can be leaked from an entity with higher security
privileges to another entity by establishing a seemingly innocuous communication channel between
them. Two parties with the intention to transmit covert information can easily communicate and
exchange information over a shared network without being detected. Therefore, it is difficult to detect
covert communications, and this can be effective and damaging security approaches if it is used for
malicious intentions. Depending on the type of methods used for hiding information, there are two
main categories of covert channels: covert storage channels (CSCs) and covert timing channels (CTCs).
In CSCs, the sender directly writes covert information into network objects, such as protocol header
fields and extensions, while the receiver can read covert information from the same network objects [1].
On the other hand, in CTCs, the sender embeds covert information by modulating the time information
of legitimate traffic. The receiver observes the covert traffic, extracts the timing information from it,
and decodes the covert information [2]. CSCs are bounded by network protocols, and hence they
can not deviate from certain behavior. This makes detecting them not difficult. On the other hand,
CTCs show stochastic behaviour and hence detecting them is more challenging.
While most of the existing CTCs are usually used for malicious intentions such as malware
spreading and industrial espionage, these channels can be used as alternative techniques for
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transmitting sensitive information in untrusted networks. For example, due to the lack of central
control and fixed infrastructure, limited energy resources, the burden of the flexibility of information
processing, and network access are put on smart things, which refer to a wide variety of smart devices
in the Internet of Things (IoT), the privacy of transmission the confidential information in an untrusted
IoT has become a huge obstacle to the popularity of technology [3]. For more specific, sending sensitive
information using 5G or 6G networks in different IoT applications, including the Industrial IoT, cloud
services, edge computing, network virtualization, healthcare devices, and authentication devices,
will bring new security vulnerabilities. 5G networks will be vulnerable because current signaling
protocols (SS7) developed for 4G networks may be critically insecure. Updating and securing these
protocols will go a long way towards increasing the cyber security of 5G networks. Another threat to
5G networks is the large amount of data stored in the cloud rather than on more secure local servers.
The data gathered by IoT devices contribute to a vastly expanded attack surface. Moreover, many
devices have security holes, such as network backdoors. The backdoors allow malicious actors to gain
a target location, eavesdrop on calls, and potentially inject ransomware into 5G networks targeted at
mobile operators. Other vulnerabilities in wireless and IoT fields include SIM card vulnerabilities,
Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol (AKA), and many base-station backdoor vulnerabilities [4–6].
Therefore, CTCs are an important alternative and crucial in the future for sending sensitive information
in several confidential applications of IoT.
Covert channels can be implemented at different layers of the TCP/IP protocol stacks and can
be used for the authentication of data sources, time, and content. Using protocol headers enables
fundamental features, such as simultaneous connections, dynamic routing, or session management
for covert channels, that enrich communications and become more adaptive and stealthy. However,
a covert channel’s effectiveness is different for each layer of the TCP/IP protocol stacks. At the
link layer, covert channels are limited to locally connected communication devices and cannot
communicate outside the local network [7]. While at the application layer, focused on protocols with
process-to-process communications over the network, covert channels are limited to the infrastructure
offered by those applications. Therefore, using covert channels at the transport layer is beneficial
because covert communication can use global Internet connectivity with increasing access to various
types of devices and a potential expansion towards various communication areas.
This paper focuses on covert channels that transmit covert information over TCP/IP, specifically
whenever the time properties of legitimate traffic are used and provides the threshold of packet delay
that can accurately distinguish covert traffic from legitimate traffic, where this threshold will save
the time of future researchers who are studying either the detection or mitigation of covert timing
channels in various applications. Our contributions can be summarized below:
1. Analyze the behavior of covert traffic and legitimate traffic in two different networks using
statistical metrics to explore how the inter-arrival times of legitimate traffic can be used effectively
to transmit the covert traffic between two entities communicating over networks, and how the
network conditions can affect the behavior of both traffics.
2. Find the threshold for delaying packet that makes the covert channel efficient to leak information.
This threshold is really important to answer the following questions in different scenarios:
- Scenario 1 (Covert timing channel as a cyber-attack such as leaking information between
two devices)
Does this covert timing channel really dangerous and need to be mitigated or detected?
- Scenario 2 (Covert timing channel as confidential applications such as sending secret data in
military mission)
Does this covert timing channel reliable to send data?
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The paper offers a brief overview of the literature on the design and detection of covert timing
channels, discussed in Section 2. Section 3 demonstrate details the designing of experiments and
discusses the transmission delay aspects adopted in this paper. Section 4 presents the accuracy of
distinguishing between the binary encoding symbols and the transmission bit rate analysis is presented.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5.
2. Related Work
In this section, valuable information about covert timing channels designed and detection methods
will be provided.
2.1. Covert Timing Channel Design Approaches
A lot of research in the literature was done in attempting to model covert timing channels.
The idea of covert timing channels was formulated in 1978 based on a study by Padlipsky in [8].
Since then, it has been enriched with diverse proposals. For example, in [9], a simple synchronized
covert timing channel proposed that used an on-off switching technique to embed covert binary bits
in the legitimate traffic within a specific time interval. The sender transmits a packet within each
particular time interval to represent bit 1 in the covert data. It does not send any packet to represent
a bit 0. Then the receiver scanned the stream of traffic for incoming packets at each interval and
decoded the bit as 0 or 1. The encoding method in this approach is simple, and the idea is very
attractive. However, this approach requires strict synchronization between the sender and receiver,
and loss the synchronization will lead to error propagation. Moreover, in [10], there was more details
about the on-off covert timing channels analysis, organized them into two fields: deterministic and
non-deterministic channels, and provides a method for calculating the maximum transmission bit-rate
in these channels based on the packet delay distribution. In [11], a similar mechanism was proposed to
encode the binary symbols where bit 0 is denoted by a fixed short time delay, and a bit 1 is denoted by
a fixed delay to hide covert traffic by using a sequence of inter-packet delays.
However, other approaches were designed without time synchronization restrictions by using
different timing techniques such as using the arrival pattern of packets [8,12]. Later Cabuk in [13]
designed a more advanced covert timing channel mechanism which is called time-replay channel,
where the inter-packet delay sequence was divided into two parts (S0, S1) based on the specific
threshold that is negotiated by the sender and receiver beforehand. Then the sender replays one
inter-packet delay randomly from first part S0 to send a bit 0 and replays one inter-packet delay
randomly from first part S1 to send a bit 1. This mechanism makes Time-replay covert timing channel
undetectable than other channels designed before because the covert traffic is approximately close
to legitimate traffic. A sophisticate covert timing channel mechanism was proposed in [14], called
a model-based covert timing channel. This mechanism was designed to choose a traffic model that
can fit the legitimate traffic and has the smallest root mean squared error between it and legitimate
traffic. The model-based covert timing channel used Maximum Likelihood Estimation to determine the
required parameters for the model, where these parameters vary to capture the variation of legitimate
traffic. Using this traffic model, covert information was transformed into a sequence of random
inter-packet delays.
Moreover, there are covert timing channels were designed based on different application protocols.
For example, the Keyboard JitterBug algorithm was proposed in [15], for leaking covert information by
adding different delays to the interval time of keystrokes to encode a bit 0 and a bit 1. This application
environment was interactive communication, such as Telnet and instant messaging. The method
was proposed in [16], used the Patero distribution of legitimate telnet traffic to design undetectable
covert timing channel and increased the capacity of the channel using encoding “L-bits to n-packets”
scheme. In [17], the authors designed a covert timing channel using the properties of inter-arrival
times of legitimate network traffic and proved that these properties are valuable information for
the designed detection methods to detect such channels. Moreover, in [18], a covert channel was
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proposed based on the postponing or extending of silence periods in voiceoverLTE (VoLTE) traffic to
modulate the covert packets. The author employed Gray mode to encode the covert message and to
reduce the impact of packet loss. The experiment results showed that the proposed covert channel
enabled a tradeoff between the robustness and voice quality, which is an important performance
indicator for VoLTE, undetectable by statistical tests, and which outperformed the other covert channels
based on inter-packet delays in terms of robustness. In [19], a general overview of physical-layer
network coding (PNC) in a Two-way Relay Channel (TWRC) was provided. The authors described
the main encoding and decoding schemes for channel-coded PNC. Based on simulation results,
the authors illustrated the decoding performance of different channel-coded PNC schemes over
different types of channels. Recently, in [20], the authors proposed covert timing channels in a shared
deterministic and work-conserving first-come-first serve (FCFS) scheduler.The authors presented an
information-theoretic framework to describe and model the data transmission in the channels and
calculate its capacity. In their model, the encoder and the decoder users used shared the packet
scheduler, using indirect communication between them to send the secret message. The encoder
user encoded a message in his traffic pattern, and then the decoder user can predict the message by
estimating the encoders traffic pattern by the delays he experiences. Their results demonstrated the
possibility of significant information leakage and greater privacy threats brought by covert timing
channels in FCFS schedulers.
Some of existing techniques also used for encoding covert information into the IP Time To Live
(TTL) field, and these were grouped into two classes: mapped encoding and differential encoding.
In mapped encoding the covert bits were encoded by mapping the bit values to specific TTL values.
For example, in [21], the original TTL value represented a bit 0, and the TTL value was increased by an
integer, ∆, to represent a bit 1. While differential encoding, covert bits were encoded by the changes
between subsequent TTL values. For example, in [22], a bit 1 was encoded when TTL increased by
∆, and a bit 0 was encoded when TTL decreased by ∆. In [23], the original TTL value represented a
bit 0 and a TTL value decreased by ∆ represented a bit 1. Therefore, the transmission times for covert
timing channel packets increased or decreased based on adding or subtracting from the TTL value
when the covert information was encoded into the TTL field.
Most of the researchers who used the time properties of legitimate traffic to design undetectable
covert timing channels used a single network environment for that and ignored analysis of the behavior
of their methods on other networks. This paper focus on using the time properties of legitimate traffic
to send covert data in two different network environments to explore the behaviour of covert timing
channel in both of networks and examine how network conditions affect on detection such channels.
2.2. Covert Timing Channels Detection Approaches
Covert timing channel detection methods mainly used the statistical tests to differentiate covert
traffic from legitimate traffic by examined the shape and regularity of inter-arrival times and
inter-packet delays. The statistical tests can be categorized mainly into three classes: The shape tests,
regularity tests, and entropy tests. For example, in [24] the authors proposed Kolomogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) shape test for detecting covert timing channels. The K-S test was used to quantify the distance
between two empirical distributions of covert traffic and legitimate traffic. When the distance between
the two distribution was large, this indicates the presence of covert timing channels in the legitimate
traffic. The regularity test was proposed in [9], using the standard deviation metric to detect the
existence of covert timing channels. In this test the high values of standard deviation provided a strong
indication of existence of covert timing channels and low values imply the absence of such channels.
Moreover, the entropy test used in [25,26] as measure to detect covert timing channels based on the
knowledge that the covert timing channel mechanism must cause some effects on entropy of legitimate
traffic. Entropy can provide significant evidence for the existence of pattern inside the data singling
the presence of a covert timing channel. High entropy indicates a high randomness in the data and
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absence of a covert timing channel, whereas low entropy indicates a high consistency in data and high
possibility of covert channels existence.
In order to overcome the issues in detecting covert timing channels based on flat statistical-based
analysis (e.g., calculating statistical tests at one-scale level), a hierarchical statistical method was
proposed in [27] to determine the existence of covert timing channels in a flow of inter-arrival
times. Their results showed a significant capability for detecting such channels using the hierarchical
based-statistical method when compared to the flat statistical-based method. As an extension of the
work originally conducted in [27], the authors in [28] used the MapReduce technique to improve the
speed of covert timing channel detection using the hierarchical statistical-based method. Their method
presented good accurate results in detecting such channels within a reasonable time compared to the
sequential hierarchical method.
Machine learning also used as another method to detect covert timing channels. The Support
Vector Machine (SVM) classifier was widely used in the covert-channel detection, such as in [29] the
authors used SVM to detect four different covert timing channel algorithms. Decision Tree classifier
also used in [30] for identifying and detecting covert timing channels. Moreover, in order to improve
the accuracy of covert channel detection, the authors in [31,32], used unsupervised machine learning
methods to classify and detect covert timing channels based on the statistical properties of network
traffic. Recently, in [33], a new covert timing channel detection method proposed based on using deep
neural networks and a set of statistical features extracted from the flow of inter-arrival times using the
hierarchical statistical-based method. The study results showed that deep neural networks achieved a
better level of accuracy and significantly shorter training model time compared with SVM.
3. Methodology
This section describes design of the experiments that conducted using real network traffic to
transmit covert information using covert timing channels between the sender and receiver in two
different network configurations.
3.1. Experimental Design
The scope of this study focuses on using the time of legitimate traffic to transmit covert information
between the sender and receiver over the network bypassing anomaly detection methods. Based on
the study’s goal, a covert timing channel application was designed and run using reliable TCP/IP
networks. The application was implemented in Java and consisted of a server program and a client
program, which represent the sender and the receiver, respectively. In the discussion that follows,
we use particular terminology while talking about covert timing channels. The sender of the covert
timing channel is responsible for modulating the time transmission of legitimate traffic to transmit
covert information using socket API, and to which the receiver has access. The receiver observes the
covert traffic, extracts the timing information, and decodes the covert bits. For a better understanding
of the application method, it is important to clarify different terms related to time properties that be
used. (Ts), is the actual sending time of the packet that transmitted to the receiver. (Tr), is the actual
receiving time of the packet and IAT is the time interval between the receiving time of two packets on
the receiver side. In addition, the actual transmission time of packet is added by additional time (ε)
due to the network conditions, such as queuing time between subsequent packets. Therefore, we can
define the time for sending the packets between the sender and the receiver, and ε, which accounts for
possible variations in the network conditions, as follows:
Tr = TS + ε (1)
The binary covert timing channels are designed as a one-way channel, where the sender does not
receive any feedback from the receiver regarding the time the packet was received or whether it was
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correctly decoded. This limits the performance of the covert timing channel, but helps to increase the
difficulty in detecting them, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Scheme of encoding binary symbols to the inter arrival time .
Experimental Configuration Setup
To study the behaviour of covert traffic and legitimate traffic in different network conditions,
the experiments of this study were run in two different network configurations (private and
public), and data was transmitted between two personal computers in both network configurations.
Tables 1 and 2 describe the computer’s properties that were used in all the experiments and the
network configuration properties were considered in the study, respectively.
Table 1. Devices properties.
PC 1 (Sender) PC 2 (Receiver)
Processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4210U Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6500U
CPU speed 1.70 GHz 2.40 GHz 2.50 GHz 2.60 GHz
RAM 6.00 GB 8.00 GB
System type 64-bits 64-bits
Adapter type Ethernet 802.3 Ethernet 802.3
Table 2. Network configuration characteristics.
Network Configuration 1 (Private) Network Configuration 2 (Public)
Internet speed 52.1 mbps download 15.9 mbps upload 42.8 mbps download 47.1 mbps upload
Latency 55 ms 58 ms
Router type Home hub 3000 D-link
Number of hops 1 1
Geographical location Personal use network Research lab at Memorial UniversitySt John’s, NL John’s, NL
3.2. Covert Timing Channel Sender
In the experiments of this study, the sender and the receiver did not require synchronized clocks
between them but did need (individual) clocks with sufficient accuracy. Therefore, the PC devices’
crystal-controlled clock was used to govern timing. It is necessary to understand the process of
encoding covert information and sending this data between the sender and the receiver from both
sides. First, the sender generates a secret message, then converts the messages’ characters to binary
format and saves it as a text file. Then, the binary covert packets will inject in the legitimate packets by
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modulating the transmission times of these packets Tsi by adding extra buffering delays denoted by
(τi), to each element of the original covert sequence of information, as shown in Equation (2).
T′si = Tsi + τi + ε (2)
For the binary encoding symbols the delays were defined based on a form of Morse code. A short
delay was added to the Ts to encode a bit 0, and a long delay was added to the Ts to encode a bit 1.
A delay value of zero indicated that no extra delay was added, and no cover information was sent out.
In other words, the resulting sequence of n-bit binary symbols were represented in a sequence of n
packet transmission time {T′s1, T′s2, . . . , T′sn} in the differences, such that:
T′si =
{
Tsi + τbi + ε if bi = 0
Tsi + τbi + ε if bi = 1
In the previous studies, the binary encoding symbols were used with delays to inject the binary
covert packets within the legitimate traffic between the entities communicating over the networks
based on assuming a fixed time window. However, this study examined using the binary encoding
symbols with different delays in two network configurations to inject the binary covert packets within
the legitimate traffic without using fixed time windows. In our experiments, the mean inter-arrival
times of legitimate traffic were used to determine the buffering delays that can be used to inject the
covert traffic in the legitimate traffic. Based on the experiments, the mean (µ) was found equals
≈0.0050 s and ≈0.0025 s in the network configurations 1 and 2, respectively. Then the time range
of legitimate traffic was measured using the 2 Sigma control limits, which consists the upper control
limit (Lu) was measured as 2 sigma above the µ, and lower control limit (Ll) was measured as 2 sigma
below the µ, same as shown in Equations (3) and (4). The time range of legitimate traffic was found
within two time ranges, [0.003109, 0.007274] seconds and [0.001254, 0.004311] seconds in network
configurations 1 and 2, respectively.
Lu = µ + 2× σ (3)
Ll = µ− 2× σ (4)
To determine the threshold of packet delay that can accurately distinguish covert traffic from
legitimate traffic, five cases were examined in two different network environments. Each case
represents a certain value (λ) that can be used to determine the delays whether the covert packets 0 or
1 based on the mean inter-arrival times of legitimate packets, where the short delay of a binary bit 0
equals λ, and a long delay for a binary bit 1 equals (2× λ), and λ value defined in the equation below:
λ = c× µ where c = {0.025, 0.50, 1.00, 2.00, 3.00} (5)
For example, in the case of (λ = 0.025× µ) in the network configuration 1 when µ is 0.0050
seconds, the delays are 0.001250 second and 0.002500 for binary covert packets 0 and 1, respectively.
The following table shows the delays used for the binary covert packets in both network configurations.
3.3. Covert Timing Channel Receiver
For the covert timing channel, the receiver is a passive eavesdropper that needs to measure the
times at which each network packet arrived. In covert timing channels, two types of times can be
used in the receiver side to extract the timing information of packets: TCP Timestamps and sniffer
timestamps. TCP timestamps are corresponding to the times at which the network packets are sent
according to the source clock, which are unaffected by network conditions. The main disadvantage
of TCP timestamps is it coarser granularity on many operating systems and demanding the use of
large timing windows for symbol encoding and decoding. While sniffer timestamps correspond to
the times the time at which packets are seen by a remote network sniffer. Due to network delays,
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these timestamps are offset from the actual time the packet was sent at the source. In addition,
these timing offsets are affected by any network conditions. Therefore, sniffer timestamps are more
conservative assumptions for anyone who wants to use these types of times to send data using covert
timing channels.
On the receiver’s side, the receiver records the sequence of receiving times {Tri} of network
packets corresponding to each binary covert packets. Then, the sequence of inter-arrival times
of {IAT1, IAT2, . . . , IATn} maps to the n-bit binary sequence same as shown in Figure 2, where
{IAT = Tri − Tri−1}. In the last step, the binary symbols re-organized to reassemble the
original message.
Figure 2. Representation of binary symbols in the packet inter-arrival times.
In this study, the total flow size of 51,200 inter-arrival times were collected, wherein each
experiment, a binary stream with size 1024-bits was injected within the legitimate traffic in both
network configurations considering the different value of λ. In practice, the monitor program
Wireshark was used to track and collect the receiving times of the packets on the receiver side,
based on the five-tuple definitions often used in network traffic analysis, consisting of:
1. Source IP address




Because the receiver uses inter-arrival times of packets and not absolute packet times, there is
no need for synchronization between the sender and receiver clocks. The sender sends the binary
covert packets using the delays that represent in Table 3 in both network configurations, then the
receiver measured the inter-arrival times of these packets. The upper and lower control limits of
inter-arrival times of binary covert packets in each experiment of each λ value were calculated using
Equations (3) and (4). Then the time range of binary covert packets in each case defined using the










where N, is the number of experiments. By calculating the mean value for the upper and lower
control limits for all experiments, the time ranges for the binary covert packets were recorded in
Tables 4 and 5 in both network configurations. The left-hand columns give the delays for binary covert
packets and the remaining two columns give the time range of inter-arrival times of these packets and
the probability the packets were received in that range based on a given delay, respectively. These
particular tables were obtained from experiments that were running during a workday in August 2019
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in both of network configurations. For example, the first row in Table 4 represents binary covert packets
sent using 0.001250 s and 0.002500 s delays, and 97% of the zero-bit packets were received within range
[0.003475, 0.009128] s, and 96% of one-bit packets were received within range [0.007044, 0.009528] s.
These results are similar to the rows in both Tables 4 and 5.
Table 3. Binary covert packet delays.
Network Configuration1 Network Configuration 2
λ c Value Zero Delays One Delays Zero Delays Zero Delays
λ1 0.025 0.001250 0.002500 0.000625 0.001250
λ2 0.500 0.002500 0.005000 0.001250 0.002500
λ3 10.00 0.005000 0.010000 0.002500 0.005000
λ4 20.00 0.010000 0.020000 0.005000 0.010000
λ5 30.00 0.015000 0.030000 0.007500 0.015000
Table 4. Time ranges of binary covert packets in network configuration 1.
λ Binary Symbol Binary Delays (Seconds) Time Range (Seconds) Probabilities
λ1
Zero 0.001250 [0.003475, 0.009128] 0.97
One 0.002500 [0.007044, 0.009528] 0.96
λ2
Zero 0.002500 [0.007241, 0.009269] 0.98
One 0.005000 [0.007437, 0.012877] 0.97
λ3
Zero 0.005000 [0.007580, 0.012301] 0.97
One 0.010000 [0.010052, 0.014773] 0.98
λ4
Zero 0.010000 [0.010077, 0.014489] 0.98
One 0.020000 [0.022679, 0.031679] 0.97
λ5
Zero 0.015000 [0.017722, 0.023021] 0.98
One 0.030000 [0.032630, 0.036662] 0.98
Table 5. Time ranges of binary covert traffic in network configuration 2.
λ Binary Symbol Binary Delays (Seconds) Time Range (Seconds) Probabilities
λ1
Zero 0.000625 [0.001754, 0.006125] 0.96
One 0.001250 [0.001685, 0.007821] 0.95
λ2
Zero 0.001250 [0.001795, 0.007915] 0.96
One 0.002500 [0.004315, 0.008203] 0.95
λ3
Zero 0.002500 [0.004515, 0.008777] 0.96
One 0.005000 [0.004995, 0.009020] 0.96
λ4
Zero 0.005000 [0.005985, 0.008864] 0.96
One 0.010000 [0.010029, 0.015721] 0.97
λ5
Zero 0.007500 [0.008437, 0.014877] 0.97
One 0.015000 [0.015863, 0.025222] 0.97
There are some difficulties in this approach. For example, the entries in the previous Tables 4 and 5
were not constant over time, they changed depending on the network conditions, such as the delay of
packets caused by network congestions or other dynamic conditions. Therefore, patterns of network
traffic can be kept dynamic in real time, and hackers will face the same problem of dynamic network
conditions when they try to choose secret exfiltration parameters to use the network environment to
leak the highest amount of data.
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4. Accuracy and Transmission Bit Rate Analysis
This section describes the accuracy of distinguishing covert traffic from legitimate traffic in two
different network configurations based on using different values of λ, and the transmission bit rate
of covert timing channels in two network configurations using different values of λ, and different
percentage of binary packets.
4.1. Accuracy of Distinguishing Covert Traffic from Legitimate Traffic
This section illustrates how the accuracy of distinguishing covert traffic from legitimate traffic
was measured and how it is possible to detect covert traffic by observing the time range of this
traffic. The accuracy is measured based on the percentage of correctly distinguish inter-arrival times
of covert traffic from inter-arrival times of legitimate traffic based on the time range for both traffics.
Where finding thresholds that can accurately distinguish between covert and legitimate traffic is
important in different applications, such as applications are designed to make the covert timing
channels undetectable for malicious activities or secure for transmitting sensitive information.
The experiment results in Figure 3 show the accuracy is 0% in both network configurations when
λ is a quarter the mean inter-arrival time of legitimate traffic. More covert traffic are counted close to
the legitimate traffic, making the time range of covert traffic overlaps with the time range of legitimate
traffic and the distinction between them hard. However, when λ value increased, such as in cases
2 and 3, the percentage of distinguishing between covert traffic and legitimate traffic increased as
well, which becomes possible to distinguish between them with a significant degree between 70–80%.
The accuracy reached 100% when λ is a double the mean inter-arrival times of legitimate traffic in
both network configurations. Therefore, using the threshold of packet delay that are less than the
double mean inter-arrival times of legitimate traffic, makes a small difference between the time ranges
of covert traffic and time ranges of legitimate traffic. Furthermore, in both network configurations,
at any time after the double mean inter-arrival times of legitimate traffic, the accuracy will remain
at 100%. This indicates that it is easy to distinguish covert traffic from legitimate traffic. Based on
that, covert timing channels will be dangerous in the case of malicious applications or secure for
confidential applications.
Figure 3. Accuracy of distinguishing covert traffic from legitimate traffic.
4.2. Transmission Bit Rate
In this study, the sender and the receiver were assumed to have gained control over one of
the systems’ resources. They started by conducting an investigation of the network characteristics
around the system, with the intent of discovering the optimal parameters of the network environment.
For example, finding the time when the network uncongested to use this time for leaking the highest
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amount of information, such as Figure 4 shows the loss of data at different time windows to explore
the congestion issues in different environments. The results show the highest losing of data was at
rush hours between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m.
Although the loss of packets was the highest at that time but still the percentage of losing the
packets was very low and does not exceed 5%.




















Network  configuration 1
Network configuration 2
Figure 4. Percentage of data loss at different time windows.
The covert timing channel that was used in this study is not symmetric, where the transmission
delays are different for the binary covert packets and transmission bit rates are different as well.
In other words, it takes less time to transmit 1024-bits of zeros than to transmit 1024-bits of ones.
This indicates that the transmitted bit rate of zeros is higher than the transmitted bit rate at which ones
are transmitted.
The fact that zeros and ones are intermixed in the communication experiments does matter, as the
results would have been different if the percentage of zeros and ones in the covert information was
different. To analyze the impact of intermixed zeros and ones within covert information on transmitted
bit rate, different scenarios were examined, where each scenario introduced different percentages
of zeros and ones in the covert information. One of the scenarios that used was 50% zeros and 50%
indicating that when the binary encoding stream with a length equals to 1024-bits were transmitted
between the sender and the receiver, the stream contained 512 bit of zeros and 512 bits of ones. This was
similar for all other scenarios, and each scenario was examined using three metrics: Ll , mean, and Lu
for inter-arrival times ranges of binary covert packets, which are represented in Figure 5. The results
showed that the highest number of bits that can be transmitted through the covert timing channel was
recorded when short delays were used in both network configurations, as shown in Figure 5a. As the
difference between delays increased, the transmission bit rates decreased, as shown in Figure 5b,c in
both network configurations. Moreover, the number of bits that were sent, based on the Lu value in the
range of the inter-arrival times, was low when compared to the number of bits that were sent based on
the Ll and mean for any transmission delays in both network configurations. This is because 1 s in
configuration 1 is considered insufficient time to send a large number of bits with high delays and
sending a mount of bits depends on the transmission speed of the network. For calculating the bit
transmission rate results that are shown in Figure 5 the following formula was used:
Td(4−bits) = N0 ×V0 + N1 ×V1 (8)
where Td(4−bits) is the time duration needed to send a binary data stream with length is 4 bits; N0 is
the number of zeros in the 4-bits stream; V0 is one of the three values of Ll , mean, or Lu for bit 0, N1 is
the number of ones in the 4-bits stream; and V1 V0 is one of the three values of Ll , mean, or Lu for bit 1.
In Equation (8), a data stream with a size is 4 bits was chosen for simplicity to calculate the transmission
Sensors 2020, 20, 2417 12 of 15
bit rate based on the percentage of zeros and ones in the covert information. For example, in the
scenario that introduces 75% zeros and 25% ones at delay τ0 = 0.00125 s and delay τ1 = 0.0025 s in
network configuration 1, where the minimum values (Ll) in the range of inter-arrival times for zeros and
ones are 0.003475 and 0.007044, respectively, the 4-bits stream contained 3 bits of zeros and 1 bit of ones,
and the time duration to send these 4 bits was equal to (3× 0.003475) + (1× 0.007044) = 0.017469 s.
Then, the number of streams that needed to transmit the 4 intermixed binary encoded symbols based







where Tu is the time unit used when the covert information is sent between the sender and receiver.
In this study, the time unit is 1 second. Then, the number of binary bits that were transmitted in per
second in all 4-bit streams was calculated based on the formulas below:
TR0 = N0 × N(Td) (10)
TR1 = N1 × N(Td) (11)




























































(a) Transmission bit rate based on λ1





























































(b) Transmission bit rate based on λ3
Figure 5. Cont.
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(c) Transmission bit rate based on λ4
Figure 5. Transmitted bit rates of network configuration 1 (left) and network configuration 2 (right).
5. Conclusions and Future Works
This study used covert timing channels by modifying the time of legitimate traffic and inject
the traffic that contains covert information within the legitimate traffic. The inter-arrival times of
legitimate traffic and covert traffic were analyzed in two different network configurations to explore
the behaviour for both traffics in both configurations and observe how the network conditions affected
on the bite rate transmission of the covert timing channels and the accuracy of distinguishing covert
traffic from legitimate traffic.
Our results found that the covert traffic did not usually exhibit extreme values when the threshold
of packet delays that used to hide the covert data less than or equal the quarter of the mean of the
inter-arrival times of legitimate traffic. Therefore, more covert traffic are counted close to the legitimate
traffic, making the time range of covert traffic overlaps with the time range of legitimate traffic and the
distinction between them hard. However, there is no overlap between the time ranges of covert traffic
and the time range of legitimate traffic when the threshold of packet delays that used approximately
equal to or greater than the double the mean inter-arrival times of legitimate traffic, making the
distinguishing between them easier. Based on these observations, it is useful to find these threshold
that can help to distinguish between the covert from legitimate traffic. This threshold can be used to
design undetectable TCP/ IP covert timing channels that can be used for different purposes.
In this paper, we deliberately avoided optimizing for any particular channel or networked
application, instead of identifying parameters that give the satisfactory performance and that remain
highly robust under varied conditions. Therefore, one of extensions to this work is development of
better framing and encoding schemes that are robust and general enough to work under any unknown
environment without affecting user perception, by making less conservative assumptions that take
advantage of specific channel or network properties. For this extension, more problem domain and
statistical related features will be added. For the domain related features, we will consider two broad
classes of features: hardware related, such as network speed, network size, and number of hops;
and software related, such as type of applications, type of networks, type of protocols such as UDP,
and type of error-correction algorithms, such as low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [34,35] for
transmitting a covert message with high reliability over a noisy transmission channel. For the statistical
features, we will consider other metrics that include mode, auto-correlation, and inter-arrival time
distribution. Moreover, for the other extensions to this work are using machine learning algorithms to
predict the patterns the network traffic based on multiple parameters of the networks, and compare
the proposed method with other previous methods in different network configurations to demonstrate
the ability to distinguish covert traffic from legitimate traffic based on the threshold of packet delays.
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